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The Historical Contingencies of Conflict
Resolution
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
Abstract
This article reviews the historical contingency of theory and practice in conflict
engagement. World War II and the Cold War produced adversarial, distributive,
competitive, and scarce resources conceptions of negotiation and conflict resolu‐
tion, as evidenced by game theory and negotiation practice. More recent and more
optimistic theory and practice has focused on party needs and interests and hopes
for more party-tailored, contingent, flexible, participatory and more integrative
and creative solutions for more than two disputants to a conflict. The current chal‐
lenges of our present history are explored: continued conflict in both domestic and
international settings, the challenge of “scaling up” conflict resolution theory and
the problematics of developing universal theory in highly contextualized and
diverse sets of conflict sites. The limits of “rationality” in conflict resolution is
explored where feelings and ethical, religious and other values may be just as
important in conflict engagement and handling.
Keywords: History of ADR , consensus building, multi-party dispute resolution,
theory development, conflict handling.
1 Histories of the Field
1.1 The Contingency of Theories
To look at the world we live in now, we would wonder where is the field of conflict
resolution. At the time of this writing, a murderous civil war rages in Syria; there
have been bombing and military hostilities in and out of Gaza; there has been
new violence in Kashmir and Northern Ireland; children and young women have
been raped, shot at, and murdered on public transportation in several Asian and
Middle Eastern countries; with accompanying protests and riots, a dissent rock
band of women have been imprisoned in Russia; the United States almost fell off
‘the fiscal cliff’ as Republicans and Democrats could not negotiate a tax and
budget plan; labour strikes and economic boycotts continue in many venues; and
in many countries (including my own), political factions of left and right have so
little in common they can barely scrape together enough votes for coalitions or
pass legislation to govern their nations. In arena after arena, we note the absence
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine Law School and A.B. Chettle Jr.
Professor of Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center.
32 International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution 2013 (1) 1
The Historical Contingencies of Conflict Resolution
of civil discourse and instead see the continuing rhetoric of adversarial, competi‐
tive, and nasty invective used by those who disagree with each other. With so
much conflict in the world, where is the ‘engagement’ and ‘resolution’ that this
new journal seeks to study and reflect on?
In this essay, I explore the historical contingency of our field. Can theories and
practice of conflict resolution, management, or as I prefer to say ‘handling’1
change our historical conditions and improve our approaches to conflict as
human beings, or does history bend and shape our theory and practice? These are,
as Dickens (1859) would say, ‘the best of times and the worst of times’ to test our
theories and practices. As conflict resolution theory and practice abound and
grow, so does conflict, some of it seemingly intractable. Can we change the world,
or do world conditions change us and our theories and practices? Can conflict res‐
olution theorists and practitioners who seek nothing less than to change how we
conceive of each other and our human differences reorient human beings away
from assumptions of scarcity, competition and unproductive conflict towards
more diverse, collaborative and problem solving means of human existence? Is it
better/easier to create theories and practice of conflict resolution in more trou‐
bled times, or is it easier to imagine methods of conflict engagement in times of
(relative) peace? To try to answer these important questions I will examine my
own take on where the field of conflict resolution came from (in my own experi‐
ence) and where it might be going.
I begin with some important caveats. In addition to historical contingency,
there is cultural contingency in conflict resolution work. My own experience
derives initially from American domestic legal ordering (both in theory and prac‐
tice) and moves out to international conflicts at both private and public levels.
And with my work in many countries now, I am exquisitely aware of the different
meanings of our words, concepts and practices when ‘transplanted’ from one
field, country or culture to another garden or military battleground. Even legal
cultures of similar genealogy (the common law systems of the UK, the US, Canada
and Australia, for example) internalize and operationalize the practices of conflict
resolution differently. I have often expressed doubts that the American form of
psychological pragmatism and narrative problem-solving, based on extraverted
conversation and willing self-examination, that informs so much mediation as
‘talking cure’ might not be appropriate in more reticent (or hierarchical) cultures
(Lee, 2009; Menkel-Meadow, 2003, 1995). So, a first question is, can there be any
form of ‘universal’ conflict resolution theory, or is conflict resolution such a socio‐
logically embedded practice that it must always be historically, socially and cultur‐
ally contextualized (Menkel-Meadow, 2001a)?
The second problem of contingency is the locus of the theory and practice of
our field. Derived as an ‘applied’ social science from the slightly ‘older’ fields of
political science, anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology and more
1 I prefer to use the term ‘handling’ because it connotes the unlikely full ‘resolution’ of many con‐
flicts. Conflict is part of life. We engage in conflict all the time. Many conflicts are good and pro‐
duce change. Some are bad and produce death, injury or social harms. So we must learn to live
with conflict and to ‘handle’ it productively as best we can.
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applied game theory, decision sciences and planning, conflict resolution theory
takes its concepts derivatively from a number of other disciplines and attempts to
unify a theory of conflict resolution that transcends other disciplines (Deutsch &
Coleman, 2000; Menkel-Meadow, 2005a, 2009a; Yarn, 1999). Whether those
‘trans-disciplinary’ concepts have their own integrity, clarity and legitimacy or
‘canon’ in the world of academic theory is one question; whether those theories
have explanatory purchase in practice as ‘theories-in-use’ (Schön, 1983) is
another. So there is a question of where theory comes from and to whom it
speaks in its efforts to explain the world.
The third problem of contingency is the arena or sphere of application of con‐
flict resolution and engagement. Can the same theory (or practice) be applied to
conflicts within families, in lawsuits, between citizens, and between and among
nations? Philosophers might call this a ‘category mistake’ as we attempt to apply
theories to different levels of analysis or to different classes of conflicts, or differ‐
ent groupings of participants, beyond the explanatory power of the categories
created for analysis, both in the abstract and practically. Most recently within the
field of conflict resolution, as I have written elsewhere (Menkel-Meadow, 2012a),
this has become a problem of ‘numbers’ in conflict resolution theory (Raiffa,
1996). If negotiation theory is often based on theories of the dyad (two parties to
a negotiation over a contested matter or thing) and mediation, arbitration, and
adjudication are often based on theories of the triad (Shapiro, 1981), what hap‐
pens to our theories and practices when we have much larger groups of dispu‐
tants (‘multi-party dispute resolution’) and many complex issues to be dealt with.
Conflict resolution theory is now applied to such varied conflicts and disputes as
two party divorces (with children), two party lawsuits (with insurers or other
indemnifiers), two nation disputes (North and South Korea, Japan and China,
with multiple national and indeed, world-wide effects), two party political sys‐
tems and multi-party political systems (most of Europe, Israel), to disputes pit‐
ting the present against the future (environmental and physical resources issues)
and to both unmediated (wars, diplomatic insults, school yard fights) and medi‐
ated (some lawsuits, labour and international disputes) conflicts. Do we have the‐
ories or concepts (e.g., ‘ZOPAs’ [zones of possible agreement], BATNA [best alter‐
native to a negotiated agreement] [Fisher et al., 2011], ‘reactive devaluation’ or
even ‘consent’) that operate in all of these domains or do such conceptual frame‐
works have to be altered in different settings? Can there be a single ‘best’ alterna‐
tive to a negotiated agreement if, in a multi-party setting, some can agree to
exclude others and others can go find another ‘deal’ (Susskind et al., 2005)?
Indeed, a focus on more complex negotiation has spawned new concepts and the‐
ories (derived from observations of practice) of conflict handling such as the pro‐
cess of commitments, coalition formation, defections, groupthink (Janis, 1982;
Sunstein, 2000), holdouts and spoilers, as well as new theories and practices for
the more complex management of complex multi-party, multi-issue dispute reso‐
lution (Podziba, 2012; Susskind & Cruickshank, 2006; Susskind et al., 1999) and
the development of ‘dispute system design’ (Symposium on Dispute System
Design, 2009), for treatment of iterated disputes between repeat players or
within organizations. As reviewed more fully below, one important question for
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the field is can dispute resolution theories and practices be ‘scaled up’ from dyadic
negotiation or triadic mediation to whole polities and complex decision making in
deliberative democracies (and elsewhere) (Erdman & Susskind, 2008; Menkel-
Meadow, 2011)?
1.2 Where Did It Come from? Conflict Resolution Theory as a Product of Conflicts
in Time
I have suggested in earlier essays on the origins of our field (Menkel-Meadow,
2005a, 2006a, 2009a, 2010) that conflict resolution theory has been a product of
the historical conditions of our geo-political international and domestic histories.
Both World War II and the Cold War, which followed it, produced decades of
important theory development and modeling of decisions made in assumed-to-be
bilateral and polarized worlds (Allies/Axis; ‘Free’ World-West/Communist World-
East) of competition, scarcity and perceived defeat of the other as a ‘need to sur‐
vive’. The game theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), which emerged from modelling of
decision making in these perceived-to-be-hostile worlds, assumed lack of commu‐
nication between the parties (the classic, ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game, Baird et al.,
1994; Poundstone, 1992), before the ‘red phone’ allowed instant communication
between the US President and the Soviet Premier, and assumed conditions of
war, domination, and later, ‘deterrence’ through arms build-ups of unprecedented
proportions. Although some game theorists also pursued study of cooperative, as
well as competitive, games (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Nash, 1953), the
assumptions of negotiations in this period were how to ‘better’ or ‘defeat’ the
other side in either one-shot or iterated ‘games’ (there is nothing game-like about
the harsh realities in which these negotiations took place) of interaction, usually
transpiring from one crisis to another.
Against this backdrop of geo-political development of conflict resolution
theory in international relations and political science, a nascent theory of ne‐
gotiation in legal negotiation behaviour began in the 1960s and 1970s in the
United States, often (as in my own case, Menkel-Meadow, 1984) in the shadow of
aggressive and competitive lawyering for the disenfranchised in the early days
of the civil rights, anti-poverty, feminist, consumer, environmental (and now
gay rights), and clinical legal education movements (Bellow & Moulton, 1978;
Meltsner & Schrag, 1974). As early forms of legal negotiation theory focused on
using competitive tactics to ‘win’ cases (often on behalf of well deserving and dis‐
enfranchised clients) the American legal culture seemed a subset of the cruel, bru‐
tish and harsh ‘cold war’. Adversarial models of negotiation taught us how to
defeat the other side with a series of tactical and strategic ploys, used to trick,
deceive and often manipulate our opponents (e.g., Cohen, 1980), often, but not
always, having nothing or little to do with the legal or other merits of the negotia‐
tion situation.
My own personal history as a legal services lawyer for the poor ultimately
coincided with what ultimately became our ‘ADR movement’ in the United States.
As I watched my colleagues fight bitterly contested lawsuits against the state
(prison conditions, welfare entitlements, resource allocations, school disputes)
and private parties (discrimination, consumer disputes, landlord tenant cases)
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and often win (Constitutional, class actions and statutory claims were won on the
law in summary judgment motions, often without trials), I noticed we not very
often solved the actual problems of our clients. Poverty continued, people were
denied benefits on new grounds, rules were amended by more powerful parties
(Galanter, 1974) and those without documentation could not win evidence-based
lawsuits. My early role model was a lawyer in my office who quietly called offend‐
ing public officials and private bosses and landlords and negotiated to solve the
problems of her individual clients, rather than using more public class action liti‐
gation. Just as I transitioned to become a clinical law teacher I began to focus on
how to teach young lawyers a new way of conceptualizing legal issues – what
about solving the problem, rather than ‘winning the case’? My early studies of
negotiation and conflict resolution theory immediately turned to scholarship and
practice outside of law (Menkel-Meadow, 1983) – where some other fields were
focused on when and how people (and animals) collaborated, cooperated or uti‐
lized more ‘mixed’ behaviours to solve their survival problems (e.g., Axelrod,
1984).
The non-technical, but theory-changing, classic, Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement without Giving in (1981) by Roger Fisher and William Ury began to
transform conceptions of both legal and non-legal negotiations in a variety of
real-world contexts and educational programmes. By suggesting that underneath
the demands or positions of negotiators, there were instead ‘interests’ (or in my
work [1984], ‘needs’) of the parties that, if focused on, could lead to ‘integrative’
solutions to problems that used trades of complementary, if not conflicting,
interests, to ‘expand the pie’ and increase resources, before dividing them, or to
look for other ways to maximize ‘joint gain’ rather than to assume maximization
of individual gain as the goal of any negotiation. The classic ideas here were laid
on the foundations of earlier work by Mary Parker Follett (in the 1920s), the real
‘mother’ of integrative solutions (Menkel-Meadow, 2000), who suggested that
oranges could be divided by peel and fruit, and draughts in libraries could be
avoided by opening windows in other rooms (Graham, 1993). Negotiation did not
have to be about dividing and competing; it could be about asking deeper ques‐
tions about preferences and needs and then seeking solutions that were more
likely to satisfy both (or all) parties, rather than only one. Relative satisfaction of
all sides to a negotiation ensured greater stability of outcomes, and perhaps avoid‐
ed the desire for revenge, retribution or non-compliance that has characterized so
many competitive ‘victories’.
At roughly the same time (late 1970s to early 1980s), a variety of legal com‐
mentators and practitioners in the United States, focusing on both ‘quantitative’
(too many cases) (Burger, 1982) and ‘qualitative’ (commanded legal solutions that
were too ‘brittle’ and inflexible) deficiencies of the formal court system (Sander,
1976), began to focus legal attention on other ways to process legal disputes,
including mediation, arbitration, ombuds and fact-finding, and then hybrids (e.g.,
med-arb) of these processes. Asking a third party ‘neutral’ to facilitate parties’
own negotiations, whether represented by lawyers or not, became facilitative
mediation (Friedman & Himmelstein, 2008; Riskin, 1994) and more active, deci‐
sion-suggesting or making third parties became either evaluative mediators or
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arbitrators. Thus, was a social/legal ‘movement’ created, naming itself ‘alterna‐
tive’ (now ‘appropriate’) dispute resolution, or called, somewhat more critically,
‘informal justice’ (Abel, 1982).
As a field of knowledge and practice, this new movement was highly aspira‐
tional; claiming it could teach individuals, parties in lawsuits, families, commun‐
ity groups (Merry & Milner, 1993), labour unions (Kochan & Lipsky, 2003;
Walton & Mckersie, 1965), public officials and agencies, and even nations, to
solve their problems more peaceably and with better outcomes. The ADR move‐
ment created its own ‘ideology’ at many different levels of engagement – legal,
neighborhood, community, political, domestic and international. It was criticized
by many for failing to take account of structural inequalities among those in con‐
flict (e.g., Delgado et al., 1985 [race, ethnicity and class]; Grillo, 1991 [gender]) or
for over valuing ‘settlement’ as a desirable social and legal practice over more
‘principled’ and public outcomes (Fiss, 1984; Luban, 1995). The founders of this
field, of whom I am one, thought we could change the world, through education,
theory development, training, and practice in a wide range of arenas and substan‐
tive domains (Menkel-Meadow, 2001b).
For many of us, the teachings of these alternative approaches to problem
solving anticipated the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), in which, for a few brief
moments, we could hope that bipolarized demonization of the ‘other’ was past
history (Fukuyama, 1992) and we would learn to peacefully solve problems, even
across vast cultural, social, political and economic differences. This optimistic
moment of transnational dispute resolution ideology was short-lived, as a spurt
of ethnic and civil wars sharply disrupted the hopes of the ‘cosmopolitans’. I recall
my own personal experience while teaching ADR in Canada and reading Michael
Ignatieff’s powerful book Blood and Belonging (1994), I recognized that peaceful
problem solving was not to be, as repressive regimes that had also suppressed
conflict gave way to bitter fights about identity, borders, scarce resources and sur‐
vival, when demands for self-determination emerged from the yokes of oppres‐
sion. A hope that a more optimistic period of human history would facilitate more
collaborative theories and practices of conflict resolution, seemed, once again, to
dissolve in the face of more discouraging geo-political realities.
Thus, for me, the challenge of reporting on and evaluating the trajectories of
conflict resolution theory, practice and ‘engagement’ is like the double helix of the
mapping of DNA – parallel bonds of upward and downward spirals as conflict res‐
olution theory and practice try to tame the less predictable behaviour of the more
conflictual real world and the conflictual real world then asserts its influence on
the development of theory and practice. Do we reach greater insights by studying
retrospectively what has happened and trying to understand what we could ‘have
done differently’? Or, should we continue to offer more optimistic prescriptive
and aspirational notions of how conflicts (in the present or future) might be
resolved? In his classic treatment of negotiation theory Howard Raiffa cautioned
against conflating the descriptive and the prescriptive (Raiffa, 1982) and advised
that analytic separation of prescription for one set of actors in a conflict from
advice for all parties (or the mediator) of a conflict might be very different,
depending on one’s orienting frame of one-sided or multi-party ‘maximization’
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strategies. So our theories may be derived from the same descriptions of the past
and go off in very different directions for prescriptions for the future, in both
theoretical and more practical domains, depending on our own orientations to
conflict. One of our greatest practitioners, John Paul Lederach has often
reminded us that our field is a long multi-generational process – he can touch the
hands of both his grandparents and grandchildren to see a span of over 100 years
of human struggle with conflict – perhaps, little by little, each generation will
learn from the one that went before (Lederach, 1995).
So our field has different histories if looked at from the perspective of
abstract theory development, untethered to any larger history, but a variety of
very different histories if linked to the contextual frames in which conflict resolu‐
tion theory and practice has developed – community, civic, ethnic, legal, labour,
political, organizational or international conflict.
1.3 Legal and Jurisprudential Histories of Conflict Handling
The study of conflict and its significance actually comes initially from sociology
(Aubert, 1963; Coser, 1956; Durkheim, 1984; Simmel, 1955), anthropology (Abel,
1973; Avruch, 1998; Gulliver, 1979; Llewellyn et al., 1941; Nader & Todd, 1978),
and international relations and peace studies (Boulding, 1962; Burton, 1987;
Galtung, 1989), and only later in time from law and legal studies (Alberstein,
2007). Only later in the twentieth century, as a reaction to the devastation of
World War II and the Cold War, has a broader and multi-disciplinary field of ‘con‐
flict resolution’ emerged to attempt some systematic understanding of conflict
prevention, managing and handling (Kriesberg, 1998; Miall et al., 1999). Much
current conflict resolution work is framed by legal and more philosophical theo‐
ries of jurisprudence and by the functions of ‘process’ in dispute resolution
(Hampshire, 2000; Menkel-Meadow, 2006b). In this our intellectual progenitor is
Lon Fuller (1981), whom I have often called the ‘jurisprudent of ADR’ (Menkel-
Meadow, 2000).
Lon Fuller, Harvard law professor, arbitrator and legal philosopher, in a series
of law review articles, based on both theoretical syntheses and speculations, and
practical experience, developed the notion of the ‘integrity’ of different processes
for different purposes. Adjudication is necessary when we need to not only
resolve a dispute, but elaborate, through articulated reasons, why a rule or deci‐
sion is appropriate, not only for the parties in dispute, but to serve (in a common
law system) as precedent for others in similar situations (Fuller, 2001). Arbitra‐
tion is best used when the parties understand the rules that govern them (e.g.,
though contract, as in a collective bargaining agreement) and want to select their
own decision makers and apply the particular rules of their repetitive dealings
(‘the law of the shop’), usually, but not always, in a more private setting (Fuller,
1963). Mediation is appropriate when the parties have on-going relations (as in a
family or workplace) and want to ‘reorient themselves’ (peaceably) to each other
or want to tailor their own future-oriented solutions to problems that do not nec‐
essarily lend themselves to more brittle ‘win-lose’ commands (Fuller, 1971). In
Fuller’s conception of dispute resolution purity, each of these processes has its
own integrity (from a structural-functionalist perspective) because each process
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has particular goals (decision or agreement), different categories of parties (one-
shotters or repeat players) and different audiences (the disputants alone or the
larger public) with different requirements of transparency or privacy. The rigor‐
ous conceptualization of such process divisions has led to more modern legal cat‐
egorization to the claims (originally made by Professor Maurice Rosenberg of
Columbia Law School, then by Professors Frank Sander and Stephen Goldberg)
that “the forum should fit the fuss” (Sander & Goldberg, 1994). Yet, in fact, more
modern practices of dispute resolution have often hybridized those ‘pure’ forms
of process, as Goldberg himself notes in arguing for forms of ‘med-arb’ or ‘arb-
med’ in labour grievances, and later, in other settings (Ury et al., 1988). Dispute
resolution in courts and ancillary to courts for legal problem solving is now called
‘process pluralism’ (Menkel-Meadow, 2006b).
Hybridization of dispute resolution processes allows us to seek consensual sol‐
utions first (negotiation and mediation) and then to move towards more com‐
mand and decide choices when the parties cannot resolve their conflicts them‐
selves (evaluative mediation, arbitration and adjudication) and, as it has been
argued, in many settings, can reduce the costs of conflict resolution, as the same
parties can shift from one role (mediator) to another (arbitrator), even as some
cleave to Fuller’s notion of integrity and suggest that such role shifting presents
some ethical difficulties (Menkel-Meadow, 2001c; Menkel-Meadow et al., 2011).
Hybridization of dispute resolution processes has produced a great variety of legal
innovation in processes that range from summary jury trials and early neutral
evaluation (in public courts), mini-trials (private settings), ombuds services in
organizations (Gadlin, 2000), variations in arbitral types (e.g., ‘baseball’ and final
offer), negotiated rule-making in formal governance (Harter, 1982) and a wide
variety of grievance and dispute ‘tiered’ processes between and within organiza‐
tions (‘I’nternal Dispute Resolution [Edelman et al., 1993], in iterated dispute set‐
tings [Symposium on Dispute System Design, 2009]) and now ODR (on-line dis‐
pute resolution) (Wahab et al., 2012). In more formal governmental settings (see
below) various forms of conflict resolution have been ‘scaled up’ for policy forma‐
tion and negotiated rule-making and decision-making in such processes as ‘con‐
sensus building’ and ‘public policy mediation’, some of which is now formally rec‐
ognized in law (at least in the United States) (Podziba, 2012). The field of conflict
resolution itself is one of creative innovation as new forms of conflicts (in person,
on the internet, and between unseen adversaries) spawn new forms of conflict
resolution that are ever evolving.
In the legal arena, both pure and hybrid forms have also led to both institu‐
tionalization and co-optation issues, as various form of conflict resolution have
been made mandatory in court settings, both to divert cases from time consum‐
ing and costly trials, and to encourage more party tailored and flexible solutions
to problems. Twenty years ago I warned that the institutionalization of more flex‐
ible and voluntary forms of dispute resolution when imported into more conven‐
tional and mandatory settings like courts, could alter the very fabric of what
‘A’DR was intended to do (allow parties to voluntarily craft their own tailored and
preferred outcomes to conflicts where law or court ordered solutions would not
suit, Menkel-Meadow, 1991). My predictions have more than come true, as noted
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in a wide variety of more modern explorations into what has happened to the
aspirational aspects of mediation ideology (party problem-solving and peace-seek‐
ing) as it has morphed in mandatory court settings into mere ‘efficiency’ and law‐
less case settlement (Menkel-Meadow, 2012b; Mironi, forthcoming). Thus, even
those of us who are founders and supporters of the field of less formal methods
of conflict resolution believe there is still some purpose to Fuller’s separation of
form and function – courts and adjudication should still be sites of authoritative
decision making, where appropriate, and forms of negotiation and mediation,
which are intended to reorient the parties to each other to seek future-oriented
solutions and more flexible or contingent or more party tailored solutions, should
not necessarily be merged into and distorted by the needs and requirements of
other institutions (Resnik, 1995).
The relation of law and legality to different forms of dispute resolution is one
of the most interesting challenges currently facing our field and its trajectories
may be different as a matter of theoretical and jurisprudential interest, from its
practical applications in widely different legal, national and international con‐
texts. Different national and regional legal systems have expanded the use of
mediation (see, especially all the recent efforts in the European Union; De Palo
and Trevor, 2012; and elsewhere [Hopt & Steffek, 2012]) in court, labour, com‐
mercial, familial, criminal and other settings, with great cultural and legal varia‐
tion. Ironically, as national court systems continue to expand the use of media‐
tion and less formal means of dispute resolution, and increasingly private parties
(especially in large commercial trans-border transactions and disputes) encourage
them (see promotional activities of the International Mediation Institute,
<http://imimediation.org>), we seem less successful in the use of mediation and
conciliation processes in major international disputes (e.g., Syria, Israel-Palestine,
the former Congo, Sudan, North/South Korea). Unlike national courts that now
strongly encourage or require mediation as a condition precedent to litigation,
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and even the many new
regional and specialty international tribunals cannot ‘mandate’ the use of more
conciliatory forms of conflict resolution before litigation (Merrils, 2010). (This is
a slight overstatement. Some of the newer international tribunals, e.g., World
Trade Organization, International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, actually do try
to encourage various forms of conciliation and mediation before adjudication.)
So, one interesting question for our field to ask is why conflict resolution
theory and practice has been so much more successfully, if somewhat co-optedly,
‘nested’ in law and courts than in non-legal (more political, national, ethnic, civil)
forms of conflict?
2. Future(s) of the Field of Conflict Resolution
2.1 Conflict Resolution Process Is Necessary for our Survival: Of Heads, Hearts and
Stomachs
In his Tanner lectures, later published as Justice Is Conflict (2000), social philoso‐
pher Stuart Hampshire, perhaps unwittingly, has written us a manifesto for the
40 International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution 2013 (1) 1
The Historical Contingencies of Conflict Resolution
future of conflict resolution studies and practice in the world. After a lifetime of
studying what we should aim for in our search for the ‘substantive good’, Hamp‐
shire concludes that the modern world is filled with too much diversity of life and
values for our species to agree on many things. We do seem to be able to agree on
the common ‘bad’ (poverty, disease, war, resource shortages, unkindness, dicta‐
torships and lack of freedom and self-determination), even if we, as human
beings, do not always act consistently to eliminate those evils. But, says Hamp‐
shire, if we cannot agree on the common good, we must still as individuals, com‐
munities, societies, and the human race make decisions about how we will act and
govern ourselves and so we must find ways to make decisions together. Building
on work like that of Jürgen Habermas (1984) (specifying conditions for delibera‐
tive democracy and ‘ideal speech conditions’), Hampshire assures us that ‘rea‐
soned argument’ and ‘conflict resolution skills’ are among the most noble of
human skills. Thus, even a substantive social philosopher now, at the end of his
life, has recognized the importance of process to human existence and flourishing,
and indeed the importance of conflict resolution in particular.
Hampshire lauds the principle of Anglo-American adversary process: audi
alterum partum (‘hear the other side’). In other essays (Menkel-Meadow, 2005b,
2006a, 2011), I have elaborated how Hampshire’s recognition of conflict resolu‐
tion skills must be broadened to acknowledge not just ‘the other side’, but ‘all
other sides’ to acknowledge the multiplicity of our modern day conflicts (in terms
of both parties and issues) and interactions with each other. ‘Hearing the other
sides’, in my view must include, not only ‘reasoned argument’ but also the other
discourses in which human beings engage with each other – pragmatic and instru‐
mental trades and bargaining (negotiation), and appeals to emotions, ethics, reli‐
gions and values (the perhaps not so ‘rational’ things that matter to us).
Thus, for me the ultimate challenge of the future of conflict resolution study
and practice is our need to combine different kinds of discourses into productive
engagement with each other – the combinations of the human brain (head),
heart, and yes, ‘gut’. To live together, with productive conflict engagement, we
need to think about, feel with, and get along with, tolerate (dare I say ‘digest’)
other human beings, whose land, water and air we must share, even if we do not
ultimately share all our values of what is most important in life. The future of
conflict engagement and ‘handling’ in my view, then, is to develop processes,
models, ideas and practices that allow us to combine these different levels of
engagement with each other. This is not an easy task. There is some evidence,
however, that some new forms of process and different forms of engagement are
at least suggesting a more hopeful future of where conflict engagement might
lead us. Thus, despite the evidence of much conflict in the world, I am hopeful
that those of us who engage in field development will continue to forge new ideas,
concepts and practices, from the materiel of the conflicts that our times have
given us. I will describe a few such efforts below and hope that this new journal
will be a source for reports of many more.
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2.2 Restorative and Reconciliative Forms of Conflict Resolution
Much attention to conflict in the legal world has been devoted to civil justice,
when in fact some of the most innovative work has been done in criminal and
juvenile justice, with various forms of restorative justice, victim–offender media‐
tion, ‘healing circles’ and other forms of more reconciliative choices around
acknowledging and ‘correcting’ bad behaviour (Menkel-Meadow, 2007; Tullis,
2013). While a few localities and states in the United States, Canada, New Zea‐
land, the Netherlands, and elsewhere have pioneered these processes, which
never totally substitute for criminal or civil processes, but often serve as a parallel
track for apology, forgiveness, restitution and plans for future reintegration into
communities, other parts of the criminal justice system have in fact become more
rigid (determinate sentencing). Some empirical work in the United States (before
determinate sentencing in the federal system) has demonstrated that more tail‐
ored forms of criminal justice, involving individualized treatment of the defend‐
ant, the crime and the jurisdiction (Utz, 1978) can actually lead to better out‐
comes and lower recidivism rates. These innovative efforts to solve problems,
rather than just to punish crimes, have also led to ‘problem-solving courts’, which
use a ‘treatment’ rather than a punishment model, in such areas as drug, vice,
family and other social, non-violent crimes (Berman et al., 2005). The alternative
court movement has made great headway in many urban areas in the United
States, despite objections from more traditional adversarial criminal lawyers, on
both the prosecutorial and defense side (Thompson, 2002).
Some models of individual justice system approaches to restorative justice
have been successfully ‘scaled up’ in some nations for public reconciliation pro‐
cesses around formal state actions (e.g., enforced kidnapping, child and sexual
abuse, and cultural deprivation in Australia and Canada of indigenous groups).
Since the first Truth and Reconciliation process in Bolivia, now over 30 nations
have engaged in various forms of ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ processes (Hayner,
2001) in a variety of different forms of truth and fact-finding, restitution, apolo‐
gies (yes, amnesties too), and efforts at reconciliation, after civil wars, genocides,
and inter-state conflict. Though the TRC process in South Africa is most famous,
since the mid-1990s many other countries have used TRC processes in many dif‐
ferent ways and for different purposes (Stromseth, 2003). In the most recent var‐
iation of this important theme, a group I work with in Israel-Palestine, the
Parent’s Circle-Family Forum (2012), is seeking to promote reconciliation efforts,
even before the formal state actors have created a permanent peace agreement.
Building on the work of mediators, conflict resolution trainers, and lay experi‐
ence, groups of people on either side of the conflict are exploring ways to under‐
stand each other’s histories and stories, through narrative strategies and story‐
telling, group activities, empathy exercises, and interpersonal engagement in the
context of both individual pain and harm, and the larger group conflicts from
which they come. For those of us who work in peace studies and activism, such
grassroots efforts raise important issues about whether conflict resolution is
most effectively engaged from the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ (my own views are
that both are necessary at the same time, and that conflict professionals may be
42 International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution 2013 (1) 1
The Historical Contingencies of Conflict Resolution
key to mediating at the middle levels of engagement between formal negotiation
and grassroots efforts) (Menkel-Meadow & Nutenko, 2009).
2.3 Deliberative Democracy and Consensus Building: Conflict Engagement for the
Polity
As the canon of problem solving or principled or ‘interest-based’ negotiation and
problem solving concepts and practices moved out from applications of small
groups in conflict, to legal disputes, to larger communities, and social and politi‐
cal conflict, a variety of social theorists and practitioners have explored the appli‐
cations of ADR and conflict resolution strategies to political decision making and
deliberative democracy. Consensus building (Susskind et al., 1999) as a structured
decision making process has been used to resolve neighborhood, community,
budget allocation, environmental, regulatory, and highly contested social issues.
Such processes, though often structured with formal ground rules and principled
presentations, also allow for the fuller expression of emotional reactions and lon‐
ger narratives, with fuller party participation than more formal legal or political
processes. A few commentators have suggested that the techniques of consensus
building can reengage highly conflictual polities and serve as models for more
public deliberation in policy formation and citizen engagement (Cohen, 2008;
Cohen & Alberstein, 2011). With more flexible formats, allowing greater numbers
of parties to participate, and notions of ‘adding value’ and joint gain substituting
for binary up and down majority votes, consensus building processes are designed
to diminish the adversarial quality, with ‘win-lose’ outcomes of political disputes.
Applying processes of deliberation to substantive areas of political conflict has
engaged both conflict resolution professionals and political theorists and activists
(Bohman, 1996; Guttman & Thompson, 1998, 2012), though others have chal‐
lenged the idea that all citizens are equally enabled to participate in such time
consuming exercises (Young, 2002). Such processes allow ‘multiple truths’ to co-
exist, as parties seek pragmatic and contingent understandings and some out‐
comes, which may be provisional and revisited, and are always informed by a mul‐
tiplicity of views expressed, and with my own hope that rational arguments are
not the only discourse permitted. The claim here is that process matters (and that
procedural justice is as essential as substantive justice, Welsh, 2004) and an inclu‐
sive, party-negotiated set of processes and ground rules, which are designed to
maximize party participation and encourage recognition of differences (the group
Public Conversations pioneered such protocols for discussion in abortion disputes
in the United States, now used for community and political deliberation on a wide
range of contested topics, such as gun control, affirmative action, gay marriage,
health policy, see <http://publicconversations.org>), can also lead to better out‐
comes and greater acceptability and legitimacy of large group negotiated out‐
comes (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, 2008). If we are to ‘hear all sides’, then all
sides need to be able to express their thoughts, reasons and feelings as well. My
own view is that contrary to the teaching of the more ‘rational’ political theorists
and philosophers, we are just as likely, if not more so, to be persuaded to under‐
stand and change our views by empathy, than by reason alone (Menkel-Meadow,
1992, 2001e). My version of dispute resolution has always focused on human
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needs, in addition to the layers of ‘interests’ (instrumental and rational) and
‘demands’ (power and entitlements) (Menkel-Meadow, 1984).
I have argued that our efforts to expand such processes to the larger polity
are one example of the legacy and promise of conflict resolution ideas and con‐
cepts, but that there is an irony in that, to be successful, such processes require
the expertise of skilled process facilitators, schooled in the multi-party concepts
of voting theory, dealing with hold-outs, saboteurs and managing multi-issue
negotiations and conflicting preferences, raising issues about the ‘democracy
principle’ in group deliberations ‘led’ by process experts (Menkel-Meadow, 2011).
Democracy theory is one thing; conflict resolution and deliberative democracy
practice are other things, and their relationship requires more work at both levels
to realize the promise of more engaged public deliberation (Menkel-Meadow,
2006c). In this, parliamentary systems may be better suited to the use of conflict
resolution theories and practices in multi-party (literally!) deliberations than the
more polarized current system in my own two-party (gridlocked) political democ‐
racy. Conflict resolution theory and practice however, in my view, does provide
some promise for development of ideas and practices to lead us out of our current
crises – in that sense, our bad and conflictual ‘times’ may be the impetus and
source of new ideas and applications of conflict resolution. I still hope that ‘neces‐
sity will be the mother of invention!’ (Menkel-Meadow, 2001d).
2.4 Dispute System Design
If conflict resolution theories and practices are to have some impact on the con‐
flictual times in which we live, we have two additional issues to confront: institu‐
tional design and transformative education. How can conflict resolution strat‐
egies have more impact on the individuals who have conflicts and the formal and
informal settings in which those conflicts occur? As conflict resolution theory and
practice has been applied to deliberative democracy, to lawsuit settlements
(including large class actions, mass actions), constitutional theory (Cohen &
Alberstein, 2011), family life and the workplace, a new segment of our field has
professionalized the idea that dispute resolution can be institutionalized and
taught in organizational, governmental, corporate, international, and other set‐
tings of iterative conflict. The idea that we could actually PLAN for managing dis‐
putes is embedded in many earlier articles in our field (e.g., Sander, 1976; Ury et
al., 1988), as we founders of the field sought to analyze what kinds of processes in
process pluralism might best be allocated to which kinds of disputes. Thus, sys‐
tem design involves the development of many different kinds of dispute and con‐
flict resolution processes (now most often arranged on a continuum of self-help,
party control, third-party facilitation or decision-making and consensual or com‐
mand processes (Menkel-Meadow et al., 2011) ), and then applied to the various
kinds of disputes and conflicts that occur in iterative settings.
Courts in many countries now require parties to at least attempt some form
of dispute resolution before going to full hearing in what is now known as court-
annexed dispute resolution (derived from Frank Sander’s original ‘multi-door
courthouse’). Organizations may use one form of dispute resolution for their own
employees (tiered counselling, negotiation, mediation, ombuds and arbitration
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before any kind of litigation is permitted), and then use another set of processes
for outside customers or vendors – online dispute resolution, grievance or com‐
plaint panels and processes, customer service lines and another set of tiered dis‐
pute resolution processes, as condition precedents to litigation by contract agree‐
ment. In the international arena each new treaty providing for agreements
among and between countries in a variety of areas (e.g., trade, environment,
transnational crime and anti-terrorism efforts, even human rights) now provides
for more than one form of dispute resolution – conciliation, negotiation, consul‐
tation, mediation, arbitration, ‘amicable settlement’, and only then may more for‐
mal use of various tribunals be used. Because so many of our international and
regional organizations (e.g., the UN, World Bank, IMF, International Red Cross,
OECD, EU, NAFTA) have no formal legal status or enforcement mechanisms in
the international legal regime they have created their own internal justice sys‐
tems (Scharf, 2006), now often employing a full panoply of dispute processes. I
have been teaching courses on International Dispute Resolution Tribunals and
Processes for over 10 years, looking at many of the processes beyond the formal
tribunals such as the International Court of Justice, the European and Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and others.
New professionals in the field now assist for-profit and non-profit organiza‐
tions, universities, governmental agencies, non-governmental bodies and other
institutions in creating processes for conflict education, prevention, handling,
management and ‘resolution’, raising a host of questions about for whom this
work is conducted – the organization, the users (Menkel-Meadow, 2009b)? These
developments may represent the more positive aspects of our field: in designing
such programmes both management and labour, supervisors and employees, cus‐
tomers and providers are often trained in basic conflict resolution and communi‐
cation skills. Though some are critical of such ‘internal justice systems’ that might
compromise or privatize the more formal and public justice system (Edelman
et al., 1993), there are counterarguments that such systems educate and make
more accessible avenues for redress of grievances, and can also have more wide
ranging jurisdictional coverage, beyond what legal claims might be allowed in
more formal settings. And, a strong argument has been made that with conflict
resolution specialization and institutionalization it is still possible, even within
the frame of individual confidentiality, to account for more system-wide prob‐
lems by examining the aggregation of individual claims and then seeking to pre‐
vent or correct such systemic problems or issues (Sturm & Gadlin, 2007).
Some industries have taken their ‘system design’ to even earlier stages – pre‐
vention and relationship development before the work is undertaken. For many
years now, the construction industry in the United States (originally spurred
by developments in military contracting) has used a process called ‘partnering’
to bring the parties together before work has begun on a project in order to
develop relationships and plan for dispute resolution in advance with contract
provisions for negotiation and mediation (Carr et al., 1999; ConsensusDocs,
<http://consensusdocs.org>). I used such a clause myself in a renovation project
of my own home and all disputes were resolved with three way negotiations
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(architect, owner, and contractor-builder) on the property at the time disputes
arose.
Perhaps the newest application of system or conflict prevention techniques is
to use mediators in transactional settings, to facilitate the making of deals, and
creation of new entities, and to explicitly deal with potential conflicts before they
arise, demonstrating the power of having a third party neutral prevent the ‘reac‐
tive devaluation’ that occurs when parties see themselves in opposition when
they should be ‘on the same side’ (Peppet, 2004). System designers, like media‐
tors, know that particular ideas or potential solutions to problems may best be
heard when not attached to or labeled by one of the parties to the dispute, such as
the use of the ‘one-text’ negotiation document that was used in the Camp David I
peace accords (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991).
2.5 Educating for Conflict Resolution
Exposure to conflict resolution technologies, techniques, concepts and underlying
values in a variety of fora, we hope, can ‘spread the learning’ about more produc‐
tive ways to handle conflicts in all walks of life. Even school age children are now
instructed in ‘peer mediation’ and ‘use your words’ to prevent unnecessary vio‐
lence, bullying in school, and to promote more productive ways to deal with con‐
flict. Many of the newer applications of conflict resolution (consensus building,
multi-party dispute resolution, deliberative democracy, system design) have now
spawned new courses and texts (e.g., Bingham et al., forthcoming; Carpenter &
Kennedy, 2001; Movius & Susskind, 2009; Rogers et al., 2013) to provide for
‘advanced’ training and knowledge development in organizational conflict resolu‐
tion. More and more schools at different levels (from primary education to highly
specialized graduate schools) and in many different fields (law, business, interna‐
tional relations, social work, public policy, land use and planning) now require or
recommend courses in negotiation and conflict resolution.
So, I am hopeful, that as the world delivers up more and more conflicts in
both intimate and mass scale, we are also developing more tools for diffusing or
preventing conflict, as well as engaging in it productively. Recall that most signifi‐
cant social change has come from conflict – both productive and deadly, including
independence struggles, civil wars and protest movements. Theory development
and empirical assessment abounds as social scientists debate whether we were
better off with gridlocked, but conflict suppressing, polarized enemies during the
Cold War (Miller, 2002) or now when conflict is so disaggregated and diffused
(even if unseen in its ‘viral’ forms of communication and terrorism) that we can
work at more manageable, if multiple, levels of conflict handling. Conflict resolu‐
tion professionals (mediators, system designers) are now more often called in for
assessment, facilitation, management or advice in highly conflictual settings.
And, most importantly, from my perspective, conflict resolution has become the
kind of field that works across disciplines, national boundaries and cultures that
even within its cultural variations, it may provide a more multi-cultural ‘univer‐
sal’ language of conflict engagement and resolution efforts.
Yet, I also worry that we, as a field, are not often enough called on to analyze
or facilitate conflict situations and that our culture remains resistant to less
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adversarial methods of problem solving. Those who seek collaboration or com‐
promise, such as my own President Obama, are still too often labeled ‘weak’
(Matthews, 2012), when they are trying to operationalize the teachings of conflict
resolution theory. Journalists and the public at large clearly still need more edu‐
cation about our field’s concepts, purposes and tools.
We have a long way to go before all conflict is engaged in productively in the
world. But despite the daily headlines of conflict, killings and many ways of
expressing hostilities or causing harms, I also think we now have so many reasons
in our current times for the historical moments we face to create the future of
new research, ideas, techniques and technologies to forge a more systematic
effort at promoting productive handling of conflict. I hope this new journal will
add to the collective grappling we are all engaged in to make this a better world.
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